Missouri University of Science and Technology

Scholars' Mine
International Conference on Case Histories in
Geotechnical Engineering

(1998) - Fourth International Conference on
Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering

11 Mar 1998, 10:30 am - 12:30 pm

It's Not What You Pay; It's What It Costs You. A Geotechnical
Engineering Case Study
J. Richard Cheeks
Stokley, Cheeks and Associates, Inc., Nicholasville, Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge
Part of the Geotechnical Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Cheeks, J. Richard, "It's Not What You Pay; It's What It Costs You. A Geotechnical Engineering Case Study"
(1998). International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 4.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/4icchge/4icchge-session08/4

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering by an authorized
administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including
reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please
contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

951
Proceedings: .Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering, St. Louis, Missouri,
March 9-12, 1998.

IT'S :'1/0T WIIAT YOl PAY; IT'S WHAT IT COSTS YOt:
A GEOTECHl\ICAL E:'I/Gil\EERil\G CASE STl OY
J. Richard Cheeks, P.

~:.

Paper No_ 8.02

Stokley Cheeks and Associates. Inc
Nicholasville. Kcntm:ky ~USA- 40356

ABSTRACT
The project consists of a middle ".elmo! construt·ted on a prcviou~ly undeveloped site. Site development required leveling a mountain
ridge and perimeter tills up to ISO fCct deep to create the relatively level 1 S acre building site Access to the site required a 1000 foot
long side hill road from the <ldjaccnt main highwa_y Neither the mvner mrr the design team obtained gcolcchnical investigations of the
site As a result, they tailed to consider the impact of the geologic setting on seepage, ground water flow, and slope stability. Near the
end of construction, slope mstabilities occurred in a cut section of the entrance road and one of the major embankment sections. The
owner, the county school board, hired the writer to determine the cause of the instabilities and provide testimony in their on going
litigation This paper summarizes the site conditions and pro_iect history. dc<;crihes the writer's investigation, describes the dispute
resolution processes, and presents two procedural lessons learned from the case: the importance oC qualified professional geotedmical
advice, and the inherent and sometimes unrecognized value nf ADR procedures

KEYWORDS
Geotechnical Engineering. r,roJC.'.sional Practice_ AOR_ Li1igatinn . Ethics_ Cul1llvium.

INTRODUCTIO"
Geotechnical engineers make important contributions to the
design and construction process for design !Ccs typically less
than 0.2 percent of construction cost \Vhcn properly tlsed,
geotechnical engineers save the owner many times more thtHl
the 0.2 percent fees by suggc.;;ting appropriate foundation
systems and identit)~ng subsurface conditions peculiar to the
site that require attention during design and construction
In this case, the design team undervalued geotechnical adv1cc.
One factor that possibly led to this attitude \vas that !he
building w-ould be entirely rock supported in a major l~Ut
section
llowever, the conclusion that geotechnical
engineering \Vas not needed f(H this project \vas misguided and.
as a result, critical subsurface conditions such as the st.~cpage
and historical landslide activitv \\'ere not identified
The-se
factors resulted in slope failures, protracted litigation, and
damages estimated betv•.reen $800,000 and S 1.000_,000

SITE CONDITIO"S A'\D GEOLOGIC SrTTI'iCi
The owner selected the middle ~chool ~ite due to its pn_)\imit\'
to the county's relatively new high school The site is located
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~-ailure.

Faults, Seepage

in mountainous terrain. The mountain tops occur at elevations
of approximately :woo to :nou fCct Mean Sea Level (MSL),
approxinMtely I 000 feet above the major valleys. The original
site _gntdes r<1ngcd between 1450 feet rv1SL along the axis of
the ridgt• at the north end of the site to 1220 teet MSL at the
base of the ridge at the southern end

CJently dipping beds of sandstone, shale, siltstone, coal and
underclay of Pennsylvanian age underlie the site.
There are
two JlHJits, first on the north end of the site, and second along
the highwrrr' alignment east of the site The first fault has
experienced a relative displacement of about 160 feet, with the
south side of the fault being up thrown
The east end of this
fault intersects the second fhult a reverse fault with the west
side up throw·n. The rel<'ltivc displacement along the second
Htult is about 200 feet south of the first Htult, and about 40 feet
tc1 the nn11h "-Jo fault:- in this region have been seismically
active in recenl geologic time
The displacement <'It the first Htult truncated water bearing
sando;;tone and coal layers and blocked these zones with up
thrown silts;tone and shale units. This blockage and the gentle
regional dip of about 400 to SOO tCet per mile from the
norlh\\·est mto the fault cause seepage discharge at the fault
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and historic slope instabilities due to the :.eepage on the east
slopes north of the fault

the Phase I plans and specifications, hut the architect issued
these documents under the architect's name. The architect
developed the Phase II plans and specifications. The owner
hired two separate contractors

DESIGN PHASF.
In 1986, the owner hired the sarne architecj who had designed
the high school located on the opposite side of the high'<-'<ay

At the owner's suggestion, the architect hired a local civil
engineer for the site development design including the grading.
access road, and utility service frorn the property boundaries to
the cxte1ior huilding lines. The architect was responsible tlx
the design of the structure, the pavmg and side walks

The Phase f plaJJS indicated 2·1 (Horizontal Veritical) slopes
r plans
Hnd specitications for the project contained several deficiencies
For example,

tOr all fill and cu1 slopes in soil. However, the Phase

•
•

thert~

vvere no provisions for benching the natt~ral
slope::. prior to placing fill
there \\-ere no provisions for internal embankment
drai11age
the specification-"' defined two earth materials,
"Eanh" and "Rock" llowcver. the definition of
··Eanh" allowed the inclusion oflarge boulders as
well as debris such as tree stumps, etc.
the testing and monitoring requirements in the
specifications \vere not ?odequately defined

As required by the owner/architect agrecmem, the architect
asked the owner to provide a geotechnical report for tht· site
In response, the same local ci\'il engineer oftered to pmvidt~ a
soils report ev·en though he h21d no geotechnical training or
expenence.
The civil engineer's proposal lo the O\Vner
included two test pits, two Standard Proctor compaction test.<..
determination of the soil bearing values, and a written report
for a tCc of$ 1,21 ~. J'he owner submitted this proposal to the
architect J(x his review and approv~il

PHASE I CO\JSTRl'CTIO\J

This work culminated in a one page, undated, unsigned report
on plain paper (no letterhead) with two Standard Proctor
laboratory compaction tests appended The report tersely
summariLcd the site geology
Regarding slope de~ign, the
repoii states,

The Pha~c r contractor submitted a total of 3! field density test
repons fiJr the entire project
The first of these tests was
performed 011 April 30, 11)87. and the ltlst of the tests was
performed on June ), 19S7 However, filling continued on the
site through August l9B7, tmd most of the 1111 was untested

Similar materials were crKountered and utili...-:ed in the
constntction of US25F and the
County: high school
site Since the adjacent construction sites are '<-Vithin
the same geologic formation, it is felt by the engineer
that cut and till slopes previously utilized can be
applied to this proposed site

The thirty~one tleld density tests are inadequate for a project
havinu: 400._000 cubic yards of till
Furthermore, of the 31
tests.~ improper testing. procedures were used for many, an
inappropriately low Proctor density was applied to the field
densities, and 110 retests \vere performed after obtaining failing
te::.t results
/\bout 1\vo thirds of thL: tests are either
unbelievable or indicate inadequate dry den.sity. For example,
some of the reporte-d test results had a combination of dry
density and moislure content that plot above the zero air voids
curve in a range that can not occur in nature

The report did not address important ~ite specitic gentcchmcal
issues such as seepage, the exi:o.tcncc of colluvium on the
natural east slopes, the impact of the faulting on hydrogeology
and slope stability, or special handling procedures k)r slaking
shale used in the embankments Furthermore, the report did not
address common geotechnical engineering concerns of site
preparation and construction monitoring such as proof rolling
the subgrade, hench-mg the slnr)lng subgradc before
embankment construction, till placemenJ, con1paction, or
compaction testing
This project included cuts and tills totaling over 400,000 cubil:
yards of soil and rock. The excavated material was placed m
fills around the perimeter of the ridge to balance quantities and
produce a l) acre building site In addition. an <-h.: cess road
was built on a side hill condition using 20 tOot cuts and tills
Construction was divided into two phases Phase I provided
access to the site, site grading, and utility construction to the
building. Phase II paved 1h~ access road and parking lot, and
constructed the school building_ The civil engineer developed
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•

•

The Pha~C' I contractor observed seepage in a major fill area
ncar the tlrst Jault The contractor had already placed a
considerable volume of fill in the area befOre observing the
sccpagt' rhe crvil engineer did not conduct any investigation
of the seepage to determine its source or extent None the less,
he directed the contr<1ctor to install a drain to collect water
from the activel_y seeping area However, the drain discharged
the water onto the face of the previously placed embankment
slope and 011l_v collected \Vater from the s.ingle point source that
had been observed
On August 8, 1987, the Phase I contractor reported a landslide
had st;rted along the entrance mad and requested a plan to
resol\ c the ~lide problem However, he received no response,
and befOre demobilizing, he regraded and revegetated the slide
area. ending Phase I
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ACCESS ROAD I.ANDSUDF
The slide at the entrance road noted previously hy the Phase I
contractor began to move again in June 1988. This landslide is
not related to the Phase If contractor or activit)' except that it
occurred during Phase II construction. Without determining
the cause of the slide or the subsurface conditions at the slide
area, the design team proposed a 200 t()ot long cantcle\'ered
retaining wall to stabilize the road slide area The retaining
wall ·'design'' specified a rock supported footing with a shcc11
key Anchors. 3 fee! long and I inch in diameter, extend out
oft he shear key into the rock The remedial plan also specitled
the total removal of the soil to rock 15 feet hehind the \vall
This 1500 cubic yard ex(avation vvould be backfilled \Vith
cyclopean durable rock matenal
Upon completion, the
reconstructed slope behind the \\·all v,·ould be a maximum 2.
inclination
Implementation of this remedial program hcgan in September
1988. By late OctoheL the contractor determined that the
depth to rock along the \vall footing was neither uniform nor at
the assumed elevation In Januarv 1989. just after the wall was
completed, new movements occurred in and next ro the
original slide area rhese nev. i movement:. damaged the \\all
and broke a water main
The movements also placed an
existing natural gas transmission line located _just above the
active slide area at risk, and the gas company relocated the
main to reduce the risk of rupture The Phiisc II contractor
responded to these problems by calling fOr an engineering
review of the slide conditions to determine its cause ;--md
develop appropriate corrective active plans
In mid February 1989. a geotechnical tlrm provided a proposal
to evaluate the landslide and develop recommendations for
corrective action
The proposal represented a typical
geotechnical approach to characterize the soiL rock and
ground water conditions . . vith bonngs. observation wells.
laboratory tests and anal;,sis culminating in a wntten report.
The estimated ICc f(n this vmrk was$ 13,600.
The Phase II contractor had employed a local grading
subcontractor on the project to implt~mcnt thL: original
corrective action J>lan Upon learning about the geotechnical
proposal to investigate the slide. this subcontractor \\Tote the
owner and, in part, said,
It is my understanding that a gcotcclmical t1rm offered
a proposal fc11· drilling the area at a co!'.t or
approximately S [3,000.00 I believe \-VC can find an
explanation Cor less expense
The subcontractor circumvented the usual JOb communication
protocol by \Vriting directly to the owner and bypassing the
Phase II contractor. Furthermore, the subcontractor's rncs~age
was in direct contlict \.Vith th~ Phase II contractor" s
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recommendation to pcrfi.mn the geotechnical analyses before
doing any additional work on the slide. The owner never
authorized the geotechnical study of the slide
The subcontractor "'orkcd with the owner and the design team
by continuing tu excavate the slide material over the next six
months. These activities catJsed the movements to spread up
the slupe and mto adjacent areas of the slope By the following
October, the subcontractor reports removing over 15,000
cubic \ards of soil and rock fl·om the slope area with about
13,000 cubic yards of crushed rock required to finish the work.
By t1li~ time. the subcontractor declared bankruptcy, and the
O\·vner finished the work with its own resources

PARKI\G LOT I.A\iDSUDE

In April 1l/89, embankment failure occurred near the first fault
again placing the natural gas transmission line located just
belmv the active slide area at risk. The ga~ company relocated
the line to reduce the risk of rupture The civil engineer stated
that he was unable to determine the cause or total extent of the
slide_ About ! I da_ys later, the civil engineer notified the Phase
II contractor of this ne\v slide and demanded the Phase II
contracwr's immediate attention
The Phase II contractor
responded by reminding the L~ivil engineer that "it is difficult to
understand hmv work can go on if you don't know what is
required ·
On \'Jay 24, 19S9, the architect directed the civil engineer to
··proceed \vith haste in contacting" the same geotechnical firm
that had prerared the proposal to evaluate the access road
slide. On May 31, 191<:0, a principal of the geotechnical firm
visited the site to observe the conditions. On June 5, 1989, he
submitted a proposal to the owner in care oft he civil engineer.
On June !9, !989, Lhe civil engineer met vv·ith a second
geotechnical firm
On June 21, 19&9, this second firm
submitted a proposal to evaluate the parking lot slide. The first
firm's proposal was for about $20,000 and the second firm's
proposal \-vas tl)r flpproximatdy $30,000
\~-'hile the c1vil engineer \.vns still obtaining the geotechnical
engineering proposals, he was also soliciting quotes to repair
the ne\\ slide area from the local grading subcontractor
mentioned previously
On June 21, 1989, the local
!-:ubcontractor bid $35.900 to repair the slide On June 22,
1989, the Owner "put on hold any actions on" the parking lot
slide or the gcotcclmical evaluations of the slide However, on
July 6, 1989, the civil engineer met at the site with a technician
employed by ~l third geotechnical engineenng finn
Subsequently, this third firm drilled eleven (II) auger borings
into the slide area This work culminated in a written report on
August 4. 198(). If one compare~ the scope of vvork performed
by the third tirm to the scopes of work proposed by the first
f\H) firms. clearly the third firm perfOrmed C\ greatly reduced
scope limited to the auger borings and a report of the findings
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These borings encountered wood fragments at several
locations. Furthermore, the till material was very '1-vet and
consisted of a mixture of soil and Vveathcred shale Shmdard
Penetration Test N Values within the fill /.one ranged from I to
20 blows per foot
Given that rock fbtgmcnts and other
obstructions within the fill distorted these lest results up\.,·ard,
one can comJude that the phase I contractor had not
adequately compacted the fill. This report concluded that
seepage \Vithin the fill was the bas1c cause or the bilure
However, the lack of compaction, the absence of stability
benches, and the burial of trees Jnd other simibr materials near
the toe oft he slope also contributed to the failure
As noted above, the specitication defines "Earth"' a~ '·dirt,
debris, loose rock of one cubii..: yard or less_ soft rock or other
materials which can be rcmm.·ed by hard (~ic hand) tools,
power tools or by npping with a buUdozer '' It should not be
surprising that borings drilled into the failed embankment
encountered wood fragments. The civil engineer then admiltcd
that he had allov•,ted the contractor to burv trees. stumps and
related matter in the toe area

The civil enginee-r developed a corrective actil)l1 plan tOr the
parking lot slide based upon the third geotechnical engineer's
boring data and report
This plan specilied the complete
reconstruction of the failed embankment to restore the site to
its original design configuration
llo\vever. the engineer's
construction cost estimate for the work was about $41 OJJOO,
and the mvner directed a redesign to redlJCC the cost
rhc
redesign included the removal of the fill material from within
the failure ?one, regrmling the Hrea on 2. 1 ~lopes \-vith benches
every 40 to 50 feet in elevation, and the installation of
horizontal drains on each bench to relieve the seepage
pressures
This revised approach reduced the size of the
parking lot The owner iniiiatcd litigation and b\d this. remedial
work in the s.pring of 1990 The contractor completed the
project in early 1991 at a cost of$219,000 In spite of these
eftOrts, slope movement.-., continue to occur in this area.

bedrock .:md veri!~~ its nature and continuity· At several of the
boring locations, the author convc11ed the bore holes to
~tandpipe monitoring \Veils and slope inclinometers
The
author abo established a lateral movement monitoring program
by setting surt8.ce points along t.he crest of the reconstructed
parking lot slide area. The report addressed
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The owner's lawyer contacted the author in June 1990 to
observe the landslides and determine their cause. and provide
testimony in their litigation Initially, the writer rcvievved the
project documentation and the various geotechnical proposals
and reports.
The author then conducted an independent
investigation of the access road slide. the parking lot slide., and
the general stability oft he colluvial mountain slopes.
The invcsrigation included twenty-one (21) borings thal
determined the range of subsurl7tce conditions. The aulhor
drilled these borings according to AST~-·1 J) .. l 586 using hollo\\

the range of thickness and engineering properties
of tl1C colluvium on the natural slopes,
the location of the phreatic swface within the
colluvium and embankments,
the geometry of the natural and as built slopes,
the Standard Penetration Resistance of the
colluvium and compacted Jill materials,
the probable cause of the slope failures,
estimates of slope safety factors, and
recommendations for remedial con~truction

DISCLSSIOI'i OF Till CASF
The o'>-\ner. dcs1gncrs. and contractors designed and built the
middle school project v..·ithout the benefit of geotechnical or
geologic engineering ln addition. the attempts to correct the
vanous slides during and at1cr the construction period were
done without the bencth of geotechnical engineering As a
result, the parties never understood the subsurfilce conditions
including but not limited to the following oversights.

•
•
•

•
WRITER INVESTIGATES SLOPF INSTAHILITIES

7

•

•

The types of material that would be encountered
in the e:-.:cavations and their engmeenng
properties were not determined.
The cxi~tence and significance of the cotluvium
on the existing slopes was missed
The
:.pecitlcd
handling,
placement
and
compaction criteria tOr the maior fills were
unacceptable /{.)r the soil or shale that represent
the vast majority of till constituents
The natural slopes vvcre not benched prior to till
placement
internal drainJgc provisions \\•ere not mcluded in
the design of the embankments and field attempts
to control seepage discharge were inadequate.
Attempts to correct the landslides were done
~,., ithout determining the subsurt'ace conditions or
the cause of the slides, and, as a result, the repair
attempts failed

Throughout

this

process.

the

owner

incurred

financial

obligation~ to construct the retaining \Vall, Lo relocate the

natural gas transmission line, to reconstruct the parking lot
::..Jidc. and to r~pair the access road slide Total estimated
damaf.!;es "',-ere $800,000 to $1,000,000
In the writer's

.. . ....... -· _,
·. 1. .
.
o:··· "·---·-·· ··-·- ...
.,..
''.it;tg;;~t&.~~Jif:iD. . . A~.tt=t.~~:_;:z~c,_\~~n-.:.<2.i"'i.;~~t~,%~~;:,.oi,.~~z.~~x,.--:-.J·~,<.":~">Y_:O,-~:~f'~;,~~~,~.'"J·f!_~.:.:.~,.f.,-:':"~~.::~{.::~"·:·~~-~:.;
.
..~~;0...,;.c.....~,"·~.).T~~';',;.~o}:p;}~"i>~~~~T,g.-?f_;.;J-~J.\W.Y~~V.Y!~i~¥"::!t~·'~:-~~:~z~~;c.;;
,
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From a technical perspective, the st:epagc rrom the ~andstone
and coal beds along and no11h of the fitult line produced a high
phreatic sur!Etce V•:ithin the embankment and nC~tural slopes tlmt
reduced the safety tJ.ctors sutliciently to cause failure
However. the mvner and design team chos.e not to SC'ck
qualified geotechnical advice during design, construction, or
afier the landslides developed This general lack of regard for
geotechnical engineering constitutes the primary procedural
shortcoming that produced the failures

LITIGATION RES!ILTS
The owner initiated litigation in this case in the spring of 1990
The complaint named the Phase I and Phase II contractors, the
Discovery
architect, and the civil eng'n1eer as defendants
lasted about 5 years During this period, the civil engineer's
office burned and all of his project files were lost The civil
engineer also died unexpectedly. ]c(lving his mining engineer
partner to defend the suit
In the summer of 1994, the parties attempted to resolve this
During the mediation. the
dispute through medi<'ltion
defendants agreed to pay about $120,000 directly to the
natural gas company fix the gas transmission line relocations
After this extended dav of medi(ltion, subsequent attempts to
settle the remaining elements of the case were unsuc~.:essfid,
and the case went to trial in February. J 995

LeSSONS LloAR "\FD

Of course, this should go without saying. All engineering
cc1des of ethics J:u-niliar to the writer clearly restr<'lin engineers
from otlCring to \Vork outside their areas of expertise.
flmvever. as this case clearly illustrates, some design
professionals do offer to provide services beyond their training
and experience
Owners, who often have no technical
background, have <1 right to rely upon the proJbssionaJ
engineer's ethical compliance and thereby trust that the
engineer has the requisite experience and training to provide all
o!ltred services

In our example. the O\·vner had a bias in favor of working with
the local engineer if possible I ~ocal tax dollars spent with local
businesses: a widely held political vie\"i However, the owner
certainly \vanted sound, reliable advice from any professional
working on the project The mvner urged the architect to
include the local civil engineer on the design team. However,
from the architccfs per:'.pedive, this simple request implicitly
meant that the owner would probably hire an architect who
would agree to hire the local engineer Therefore, the architect
complied \Vith the owner's request and placed the local
engineer on the design team

or

The jury trial began in the county seat
the owner school
board In their opening statements. the 0\\'ner argued tim! he
had hired design and construction professionals and trusted
them to perfom1 properly lie further argued that the Jailures
clearly demonstrated their respective negligence fhe architect
argued that the slope failures were unrelated to the architect's
responsibilities on the project The decea~ed civil engineer's
partner argued that the service~ his fOrmer panncr had
provided were consistent \vith generally accepted engineer:ng
practice. The Phase I contractor argued that he followed the
plans and specifications and the design \vas deficient
The
Phase 11 contractor argued that he had no responsibility tc-11 the
failures or the e"Xpansion of the failure arcn during the owner
and design team mandated repair attempts
While the first witness was giving testimony. a juror's il:imJly
member became ill, ratising the trial to recess for one dav
During this recess, the parties settled the remaining clements of
the case for $500.000
J'he \\Titer is not <l\Var·e of L]H:' relative
contributions to this settlement b_v the various defendants
This litigation took five year:- to resolve and cost the parties
substantial sums. Considering the limited infom1ation available
to the author, the owm~r·s litigation costs were probably over
$200,000 The defendants each mounted substantial detCnses
that included expert consultation and deposition testimony.
The total combined litigation costs for this ca~e probably
exceeded $400,000
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lhe local engineer may· have had the required experience and
training to provide the specif-ic design services assigned to him
by the architect However, the same engineer also offered to
provide the required geotechnical services even though the
local c1vil e11gincer was clearly not qualified to provide
geotechnic<1l engineering services.
llowcver, the architect
continued to feel the owner"s pressure and, as a result, failed to
indicate that the ov.,rJer should hire a qualified geotechnical
engi11eer to conduct the subsurface investigation instead of the
local ci\·il cngmeer
!'he ov;ncr -t!Jn.varded the local engmeer\ proposal fOr the
soils report to the architect for his review and advice. The
mvner wanted the architect's counsel because the architect had
specifically invoked the owner's obligation to provide a soils
report to the design team Linder the terms of the
owner/architect agreement. This act by the owner created a
related dul)' for the architect to lJSe his expertise and
cxpcnence in assessing the proposal's adequacy. The architect
responded v,:ith a v.Titten approval
This particular architect \Vas nearing the end his career_ Over
the vcars_ he had many opportunities to review geotechnical
proposals and reports, and to interact with practicing
geotechnical engineers He either knew or ~hould have known
that the proposal submit!ed for his review was inadequate.
Furthermore. when the cngincc1 submitted the ''soils report'',
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its inadequacy was apparcm on its face.
However. the
architect decided not to advise the O\vncr that the proposal and
the report were inadequate and inconsistent with geotechnical

work

Do No.t..Bc Discourage<Uf.EarlyJ~.r.~.=.JriJtl Settlt;mern.
Appear To rail

'~!tempts

Construction industry disputes u~ually involve complex ISsues,
large amounts of money . and multiple parties These factors
can magnifY the disputants' differences and discourage any face
to face discussions
As a direct result. they place greater
reliance upon their lawyers and sometimes their experts to
resolve the matter on the disputant's behalf Hovvever, the
lawyers tend to adopt the adversarial postures required tOr
litigation, and these positions are not consistent 1.vith the
conciliatoty approach that is usually required to achieve a t~tir
out of court settlement
Furthennore, the disputants, whether they are mvners, design
professionals or constmction professionals. tend to view the
issues from their unique perspectives
Their narrow vi<;;ion
limits their ability to seriously consider the validity of the
opposing vie\vs
For example, at the end of this dispute,
neither the owner nor the architect was able to admit their
respective contributions to the merflll problem even though the
decision to hire the local t.:ivil engineer f{)f the geotechnical
work clearly set the gears of failure into motion The owner
was not able to understand that his early intervention on behalf
of the locfll engineer applied undue pressure on the architect
Likewise. the architect could not admit that he had yielded to
this pressure in the f3.ce of' an inadequate gcotl'chnic(ll S\UCI\

Alternatives to the process dri\ en and <1dversarial
litigation/binding arbitration can often overcome the obstacles
to communication and reasoning by introducing a neutral partv
into the discussions.
The neutral pal1y listens to each
disputant's position, distill') the core issues in dispute, <~nd
forces each disputant to seriously address the opposing vicv.:s
While mediation or other ADR processes may not resolve the
case during the allotted time, the disputants will usually· leave
the process with a better understanding or not onlv theit
positions, but those of the other parties as well. As the trial
date approaches, the parties fl·equently settle virtually on the
court house steps. These I Ith hour resolutions have often
grov..rn from previnus "unsuccessful"' settlement di:;cussions
Mediation, l\.·1ediation/Arbitnttiml. and other A.OR procedures
should be implemented by the disputants as soon as possible
Even if early attempts to resolve the dispute appear to rail. 1hc
parties should continue to explore every· pn~sible avenue to
resolve their differences befOre engaging an adversarial
process Even then. the pat1ies should be receptive to any
attempt to settle throt1ghout discovery
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Experience suggests that over ninety pcrc~nt of all construction
dispute~ are settled prior to trial or arbitration

Furthennore,

data suggests that of the money consumed by these disputes,
about tw-o thirds is spent on lav,'yers, experts, discovery, and
other related systemic costs
Only about one third of the
money is available to ··fix" the problems. Jn this case, the
writer estimates that 1he mvner spent about $200,000 or more
to obtain the $620,000 l /- selllcment paid to the plaintiff~,.
The various defendants probably spent another $200,000 or
more in litigation expenses TherefOre, total settlement and
dispute rcsolu!ion costs of$ 1.()20,000 or higher were incurred,
and at the end of the day, the owner neHed about $420,000 or

less to apply to the $800.000 to $1,000,000 estimated
damages.

CLOSURE
The design Learn and

O\VntT em only determine an appropriate
level of geotechnical service aticr discussing the geotechnically
signilican1 project parameters with an experienced geotechnical
engmeer. Then the geotechnical engineer can fully discuss the
nsks and provide recommendations for exploration, testing,
and analyses to determine the significant subsurface conditions
;wd develop a 1..vritten report that provides engineering
recommendations tOr design and constmction to mitigate
against the ri:>.ks
The bo11om line is that a geotechnical
engineer should be included on the design team early during
design J()r any projec! involving e<:~rth supported structures or
eanh construction

\Vhen no geotechnical advice is obtained, or inexperienced
engineers attempt geotechnical engineering, significant site and
subsurface conditions often remain undetected. As in this case,
these unidentilicd conditions ollcn become known during or
after construction, resulting in project delays, tB.ilure of project
structures, ltlcreased construction costs, damages to third
parties, and allegations of negligence.

The decision m this case to try saving the $10,000 to $20.000
thot may haw hccn required for a design phase geotechnical
evaluation resulted in $800,000 to $LOOO.OOO in estimated
dam<1gcs and litigation costs totalling over $400,000. The
failure to have construction monitoring and testing by an
experienced geotechnical cngmcer during the earthwork
resulted in a major embankment failure and important site
conditions being misunderstood The decision to attempt the
landslide repairs \Vithout investing the $13,000 and $20,000 to
clctcnnine the causes or the failures resulted in unsuccessful
and more costly repairs This project proves the old adage,

It's not what :you pay;

it's what it costs you.

